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In this paper, we propose that IT managers make investment decisions about new IT 
initiatives based on a modified rational expectation model. Unlike traditional rational 
expectation models, we emphasize the relevance of market uncertainty and its impact on 
the return of new IT investment. This results in information acquisition decisions by 
managers that can cause information asymmetry. This information asymmetry is 
endogenous and so the IT manager can become well informed if and only if it is 
beneficial to do so. We also capture different levels of IT investment across managers by 
introducing heterogeneity across managers in terms of different levels of initial capital.  
Based on a simulation analysis to validate our theoretical model, we find that it is the IT 
manager with larger initial capital outlay who is particularly interested in acquiring 
information about their IT investments in order to reduce any asymmetry with 
competitors. Furthermore, we find that holding other things constant, fewer IT investors 
are informed when information cost increases and in consequence the difference of 
investment level between the informed and uninformed investors is more pronounced.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The IT revolution and its contribution to the economy have been widely studied in the 
literature.1,2,3,16,19 Dedrick et al.1 systematically discuss and confirm that greater 
investment in IT is associated with greater productivity growth. The evidence that 
supports this view is based on return of IT investment calculated from disaggregated firm 
level data.4,5,6,7 Particularly, Anderson et al. 6 have found a positive relationship between 
firm value and relatively large IT spending and a negative relationship between firm 
value and relatively small IT spending. The question that is of interest here is that if 
greater IT investment is linked to greater firm value, then why don’t all firms invest more 
in IT?  
 Specifically, we address the following research questions:  
(i) How do we measure the asymmetric information across IT managers? 
(ii) What happens to the size of IT investment if IT managers have asymmetric 
information regarding the future return of their IT investment? 
  Information asymmetry is created when one IT manager has more information than 
the others. We evaluate two types of managers: the informed and uninformed manager. 
The informed manager can perceive the return of his future investment by paying a cost 
for the information-gathering process. Whereas, the uninformed manager cannot observe 
the return but can observe the cost of the investment through the price and then deduce 
the future return. It is hypothesized that the existence of such information asymmetry 
may have significant effects on the level of IT investment. For example, the manager who 
has more information about the IT industry is perhaps more likely to have more profitable 
IT investments.   
 To address the research questions stated earlier, we propose a theoretical model that 
suggests that different levels of IT investment across firms occur due to asymmetric 
information acquired by IT managers. In other words, we investigate the role of 
asymmetric information on IT investment decisions by studying the link between the size 
of IT investment and the information used to make such decisions. We set up a rational 
expectation model wherein the measurement of asymmetric information depends upon 
the manager’s initial capital expenditure.  The rational expectation model introduces 
heterogeneous investors (in terms of initial capital) who decide whether to acquire costly 
information on the proposed IT investment.  The number of informed investors is 
endogenously determined; in equilibrium, the market price reveals sufficient information 
such that the marginal investor is indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring 
information.  We show that the informed investors have higher new IT investments, and 
we link the acquisition of information directly to initial capital expenditure by assuming 
that initial capital and absolute risk averseness are inversely related. 
 It should be noted that the authors of this paper are not the first to introduce the role 
of uncertainty in the context of IT investment decision making. As is typical of large 
capital outlays, IT investments are often evaluated using standard discounted cash flow 
techniques such as net present value. However, such techniques do not consider the 
uncertainties behind IT investment decisions.  Kambil et al., 9 Benaroch and Kauffman10, 
Zhu, 11 and Tallon et al.12 have previously addressed this shortcoming using real option 
analysis. These studies view technology investments as real options in the presence of 
asymmetric information across decision makers. In this setup, under uncertainty, firms 
may have the option to defer an investment until a later period.   One specific assumption 
about this approach is that the firm has a monopoly power over an investment 
opportunity. In contrast, our proposed model views IT investments as asset investments 
(see Ref. 13, 14, and 15) and all IT decision makers as price-takers in the competitive 
market for the investment opportunity (which is important according to Ref 17). In 
addition, our model tries to investigate the inherent uncertainty in such decisions and 
makes the best choice before making investments.  
Similarly, a study by Zhu and Weyant8 shows how asymmetric information about 
firm’s cost function affects firms’ decisions to adopt the technology. Using a two player, 
two stage game theoretic model, they define asymmetric information as a situation 
wherein one of the firm’s managers know its own cost function but do not know the cost 
of their competitor. This model demonstrates that market uncertainty may actually induce 
firms to act more aggressively under certain conditions. This study also shows that 
having better information is not always a good thing. In contrast to Zhu and Wyant8 our 
model emphasizes the market uncertainty on return of new IT investment.  This leads to 
an information acquisition decision by each manager. In this setup, the information 
 asymmetry is endogenous and so the decision maker will become informed if and only if 
it is beneficial to do so.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section characterizes the 
model and the corresponding results. Following this we use a simulation to validate our 
model.  The final section provides some concluding remarks including implications for 
practice. 
 
2.  The Model  
 
Our proposed model is an extension of the noisy rational expectation model with costly 
information acquisition introduced by Grossman and Stiglitz.13 In order to capture the 
different levels of IT investment across managers we introduce heterogeneity across 
managers in terms of different levels of initial capital.  One result of this assumption is 
that, in equilibrium conditions, some managers acquire an information advantage over 
others.  
 We assume the market for a new IT investment has a large number of investors, 
such that each investor has an infinitesimal effect on the IT market.  The investors are 
uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1] according to the level of their initial capital.  
Besides this risky IT investment, the investor also has a risk-free asset to invest with a 
lower average return. Each investor makes two sequential decisions: strategic information 
acquisition about IT investment and demand decision of this risky IT investment (based 
on the important phases to formulate business strategies proposed by Ref 18).  If the 
investor decides to acquire information, she pays a cost c.  Otherwise she remains 
uninformed about the future return of the IT investment.  In order to focus on the 
information acquisition decision, we assume that there are no barriers to investment 
other than the cost of information.   
 The decision to acquire information on a new IT investment is based on a 
comparison of the expected utility when informed to the expected utility when 
uninformed. To emphasize the role of asymmetric information, we assume IT manager as 
a representative of the firm who makes IT investment decisions to bring the highest profit 
or utility for the firm. This is true if the IT investment levels are small. It may be true that 
CIO’s in most organizations need to have presidential or board level approval for capital 
expenditures above some dollar limit, however, the final decision may largely depend on 
how much information they brought to the board regarding the IT investment.  By 
assuming the IT manager as a single investor who maximizes his utility, we eliminate the 
possibility of a principal-agent problem between the firm and its manager.  
 The information acquisition process leads to two types of investors in the market: 
the Informed (I) investors with information on IT market, and the Uninformed (U) 
investors. Below we identify a cutoff default initial capital K , such that investors with 
initial capital above this cutoff become informed, and the investors with default 
investment below the cutoff remain uninformed.  Given the distribution of initial 
capital 0( )f K , a higher cutoff K implies a lower proportion of informed investors (as 
the proportion of informed investors equals to
1
0 0( ) 1K f K dK K= −∫  ). Both informed 
and uninformed investors make demand decisions about the new IT investment. The 
quantity of investment of informed investors depends on the revealed information on the 
future return of the new IT investment. The demand of uninformed investors depends on 
 the asset prices only.  Equilibrium prices clear the market by equating IT investment 
supply to its demand. 
 Since our rational expectation model is based on a two-stage game, we use the 
backward method. That is, starting with the second stage, we first solve the demand 
decisions given the information type.  This is achieved by maximizing the IT investor’s 
expected utility of future total return. The future total return is calculated from the return 
of current new IT investment and the return of risk-free investment. The First Order 
Condition (FOC) from this maximization producer yields the demand of new IT 
investment for both types of investors.  Second, we solve the equilibrium price by 
equating total IT investment supply (which is given) to total IT investment demand (sum 
up the demand of new IT investment of informed and uninformed investors).  We can 
then use the investment demand and supply information to make the first stage decision – 
that is the information acquisition decision. This decision is made by comparing the 
expected utility of being informed and being uninformed. The investor will choose to be 
informed if the expected utility of being informed is higher than that of being 
uninformed. The detail derivation and corresponding results for this analysis are 
elaborated in the next section. 
 
2.1. The New IT Investment Decision 
 
Assume that each investor has an initial capital 0K  that will be invested in two types of 
assets: a risk-free investment (also call risk-free asset) with normal return and a risky IT 
investment (also called risky asset) with higher return.  Denote by lI  the demand of risky 
asset by individual of type l  ( ,l I U= ).  Assume that investors have access to a risk-
free asset available in limitless supply.  Then the investor of type l  will borrow/lend an 
amount of the risk-free asset equal to: 
0 ( )
lK c I Pρ− + , 
where ρ  is a function that equals zero if the investor is uninformed ( l U= ) and one if 
the investor is informed ( l I= ), P  is the price of risky asset, and c  is the information 
cost paid by an informed investor. Intuitively, it is the amount of money from initial 
capital ( 0K ) after paying off the information cost ( ρ c) and the new IT investment 
( PI l ). 
 Denote the gross real return of risky asset and the risk-free asset by R and 
r respectively.  The variable R  is defined as: 
 ,R θ ε= +  (2.1) 
where the random variable θ  has a normal distribution with mean θ  and variance φ .  
The error term ε  is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2σ .  The random 
variables θ  and ε  have a multivariate normal distribution with ( ) 0E θε =  and 
2( | )Var R θ σ= .  θ  is observable to the informed investors at cost c.  Thus, given the 
 risk-free return r, the investor of type k with initial capital 0K  has future total investment 
return (in period one) 
1
lK  of the following form: 
1 0( ) ( )
l lK K c r I R rPρ= − + − . 
 That is, the future investment return consists of two parts: the total return from new 
IT investment RI l , and the return from the risk-free investment r( 0 ( )
lK c I Pρ− + ).  
Next, we characterize the maximization of expected utility for two types of investors.  
Assuming an exponential utility function, the investor of type l  ( ,l I U= ) has utility 
1( )
lV K  of the form: 
 
1 1
( ) exp( )l lV K aK= − − , (2.2) 
where a  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for an individual. Given the above 
utility function, the demand for risky financial assets will rise with initial capital if the 
investors with higher capital are less risk averse.  It is reasonable to assume that one will 
be less risk averse if he owns larger initial capital. We thus adopt the following simple 
form of the inverse relationship between initial capital and risk aversion: 
0 0( ) 1/a a K K= = . 
 Both informed investors and uninformed investors maximize the above expected 
utility in terms of the future capital income.  Since the asset return components θ  is 
observable to the informed investors, the expected utility of the informed investors 
( l I= ) can be written as follows: 
( )0
1 1 1
2
2 2
( ( | )) exp ( | ) ( | )
2
exp( ( ) ( ) )
2
I I I
I I I
aE V K a E K Var K
aa K c r I rP I
θ θ θ
θ σ
  = − − −  
  
= − − − + − +
 
 The first order condition to the maximization of the above expected utility with 
respect to II  yield:  
 2
I rPI
a
θ
σ
−
=  
0
1where a
K
=  (2.3) 
 The demand is positively related to the observed return, and negatively related to 
the price and the variance.  Note that the larger the initial capital is, the larger the demand 
for risky assets because the individual is less risk averse. 
 The uninformed investors ( l U= ) infers partial information about this realized 
asset return component from the price function * ( )P sθ, , where s , the random per 
capita supply of the risky asset, is independent of the random variables θ  and ε . Thus 
the expected utility is as follows:  
 ( )( 0
1 1 1
2
2
( ( | )) exp ( | ( )) ( | ( ))
2
exp ( ( | ) ) ( | )
2
U U U
U U U
aE V K P a E K P Var K P
aa K r I E R P rP I Var R P
θ θ θ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
  , = − , − ,  
  

= − + − + 

where ( | )E R P∗  denotes the expected return on asset for an uninformed investor based 
on the observed price.  The first order condition to the maximization of the above 
expected utility with respect to UI yields the following demand function for the 
uninformed:  
 
0
( | ) 1       
( | )
U E R P P rPI a
KaVar R P P
∗
∗
= −
= , =
=
 (2.4) 
 Comparing Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.4), the demand of uniformed investor differs from 
that of the informed both in terms of the underlying variance in the return and in the 
expected return.  The implications for relative demands of the informed versus the 
uniformed will be discussed in more detail in the equilibrium section.  
 
2.2. Equilibrium Price Distribution 
 
The equilibrium price of a new IT investment equates investment supply to investment 
demand.  The supplied asset is purchased by both informed and uninformed investors.  
For the moment, we take as given that there is a common cutoff initial capital ( K ) across 
investors with only investors with initial capital above K  becoming informed.  Thus the 
demand for the risky asset is the sum of the demand by informed investors and the 
demand by uninformed investors.  Given the uniform distribution of investors, the 
demand is the integral of investors’ demand over the initial capital distribution, and we 
have the following equilibrium condition for the risky asset: 
1 1
0 0 0 0 0 00 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ;
K U I
K
I f K dK I f K dK sf K dK+ =∫ ∫ ∫  
where s  is per capita supply of the risky asset with mean s  and variance χ .  Therefore, 
the total demand in the left side of the above equation equal to the total supply in the right 
side.   
 According to the demand decisions based on Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4), the equilibrium 
condition can be simplified as: 
 
1
00 20
00
1( | ) 1
( )( )( | ( )
K
K
E R P P rP rP dKs dK
a Ka KVar R P P
θ
σ
∗
∗
= − −
= ⋅ + ⋅ ,
= ∫ ∫  (2.5) 
 Similar to Grossman and Stiglitz, we define a prior price function 
 
w
 
in order to 
characterize the equilibrium price.13  In our context, the prior price function is defined as: 
 
2
2
( )
( ) ,
1 (1 )
2
s sw s
K
σ
θ θ
−
, = −
−
 (2.6) 
 where s  is the mean of random per capita supply of the asset.  The price w  equals the 
random variables θ  plus a supply noise and an observation error as well, with its 
expectation ( | )E w θ θ=  and variance 4 2 2 2( | ) 4 /(1 )Var w Kθ σ χ= − .  This 
variance measures how effective the uninformed investors infer information from the 
perceived price.  Obviously, the observation error σ  and supply noise χ  affect the 
information precision for the uninformed investors. 
 Assuming that θ , ε and s  are mutually independent with a joint normal 
distribution, there exist an equilibrium price such that the equation in Eq. (2.5) are 
satisfied.  The particular form of the prices is: 
 
2 2
2
2 2
2
1 1(1 ) ( ) ( | ( ))
2 2
( | ( ))
1
( | ( ))
1 ( )
2
K w s K E R w s
Var R w s
K K
Var R w s
s
P
r
θ θ
θσ
θσ
− ⋅ , ⋅ ,
,
−
,
+ −
= ,
+
 (2.7) 
 Proof:  See Appendix A.  Note that Appendix A also demonstrates that variance in 
the return for asset , ( | ( ))Var R w sθ,  depends on the variance in information noise 
(φ ), observation error (σ ), and supply noise ( χ ). 
 From Eq. (2.7), it can be shown that an increase in the information noise, 
observation error or supply noise decreases the informativeness of the price system.  
Further, it is easy to see that the market price reveals more information regarding the 
return if the cutoff K  is lower, implying a higher proportion of investors who are 
informed. 
 
2.3. Equilibrium and Information Acquisition Decision  
 
We now define the equilibrium cutoff initial capital K , such that for the marginal 
investor with capital K , the expected utility of becoming informed is equal to that of 
remaining uninformed.  Given the above demand decisions and price functions, we derive 
the expected utility from being informed ( 1( ( ))
IE V K ) versus being uninformed 
( 1( ( ))
UE V K ) in the Appendix B.  For the marginal investor, 
1( ( ))
IE V K = 1( ( ))
UE V K , which can be solved for the cutoff of initial capital for the 
marginal investor, K .  In particular, we have the following equilibrium condition that 
determines the capital of the marginal investor:  
 
( | )exp( ( ) ) 1   (0,1]
( | )
Var Ra K rc K
Var R w
θ
⋅ = , ∈   (2.8) 
Given ,   r c and the variance parameters, we can solve Eq. (2.8) for the equilibrium K .   
 To better understand the above equilibrium, we now characterize the individual 
decision of information acquisition, which compares the expected utility of being 
informed and uninformed.  The expected gain of acquiring information is the difference 
between the expected utility of being informed and the utility of being uninformed.  
 Appendix B and Appendix C provide a detailed derivation of the expected gain.  An 
investor becomes informed if the expected gain is positive.  We show that the expected 
gain to becoming informed is an increasing function of the initial capital and a decreasing 
function of the cost of information at Appendix C.  
 The above results suggests that the investors who have the lowest information cost 
per unit of initial capital (hereafter referred to as the information cost ratio, 0c K/ ) will 
purchase the information first, and so on until the gain of acquiring information goes to 
zero and the equilibrium K is determined.  We thus have the following proposition: 
 Proposition 1:  Given our assumption of a uniform distribution of investors’ capital, 
information cost ratios are monotonically decreasing over the range [0,1] .  There exists 
a cutoff information ratio, c K/ , such that an investor purchases information if and only if 
0c K c K/ ≤ / . 
 Proposition 1 provides a characterization of which investors will acquire 
information concerning the new IT investment; those investors with initial capital 
0K K>  become informed and the other investors remain uninformed.  The intuitive 
reasoning for this result is that the lower risk aversion that accompanies higher initial 
capital results in individuals acquiring a larger new IT investment; this makes it more 
advantageous to pay the fixed cost c to become informed regarding such risky 
investment. 
 Now consider the marginal investor, who is indifferent between being informed and 
uninformed in equilibrium.  If we increase the information cost, then the gain of 
information for the original marginal investor will be negative, and the marginal investor 
will have a clear preference to remain uninformed.  We thus have the following 
proposition with respect to the equilibrium cutoff level of initial capital K . 
 Proposition 2:  Given the parameters defining the home and foreign markets, the 
equilibrium cutoff capital, K , is an increasing function of the information cost. That is, 
/ 0K c∂ ∂ ≥ . 
 See Appendix D for the proof of Proposition 2.  Proposition 2 has important 
implications for the discussion of the different level of investment decision. 
 To explore this issue, we first discuss how costly information leads to different level 
of investment by comparing expected demands derived from Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4). The 
expected demand by an uninformed investor is less than his expected demand of 
informed investors. That is: 
 ( ) ( )U IE I E I≤ , (2.9) 
where strict inequality holds if and only if the information cost is positive ( 0c > ). The 
detail proof of this result appears at Appendix E.  
 Intuitively, there are two factors that lead to the above results.  First, the uninformed 
investors can only infer partial market information through the asset prices, which results 
in larger potential risks that limit their investments.  Second, the uninformed investors 
have smaller initial capital, which makes them more risk averse.  Thus they have less 
risky asset investment than informed investors.  
 If we summarize the expected demand of investment for both types of investors, the 
above results lead to the following proposition. 
  Proposition 3:  The expected demand of one's new IT investment is lower for the 
uninformed investors than for the informed investors. 
 Proposition 3 implies different new IT investment levels among investors under 
asymmetric information.  A positive information cost for the market entails information 
asymmetry.  Thus, we have the result in Eq. (2.9).  By presenting a dynamic information 
acquisition process for investors and explicitly introducing information costs, we can 
further characterize the change in the difference of investment level by a change in 
information cost.  The difference can be measured from the ratio of the demand between 
the informed and the uninformed: 
4
4 2
2
2
2 2
4
(1 )
2
( )  
( )
I
K
U
E I
E I
φ
σ χ
φ
σ φ
σ
+
−
+ −
=  
 Now suppose that the information cost c increases.  Recall that in Proposition 2 we 
have shown that the cutoff initial capital for the marginal investors K  is an increasing 
function of information cost. In addition, the value of 
( )
( )
I
U
E I
E I
 is increased from above 
equation.  Therefore, we have the next proposition. 
 Proposition 4:  The investment level between the informed and uninformed will be 
more pronounced if the information cost increases. 
 Another new feature of our model is that we identify different degrees of investment 
across investors. Proposition 1 suggests that the investors with a lower information cost 
ratio will be informed. Proposition 3 further shows that these informed investors have 
more investment. Thus we anticipate that investors with a relatively low information cost 
ratio will be more likely to have larger investments. 
 Proposition 5:  Given the information cost for acquiring information, investors with 
larger initial capital tend to invest more in the new IT investment. 
 The information cost ratio allows us to interpret the effect of asymmetric 
information on investment levels in two ways. First, we expect to see that the different 
levels of investment will be more pronounced if the cost for information gathering 
increases. Second, we have an implication to further empirical studies that the extent of 
investment tends to be larger for those investors who have larger initial capital. 
 
3.  An Example Simulation 
 
The theoretical model proposed in the last section analyzed how asymmetric information 
leads to different degrees of IT investment. In this section, we investigate the effect of 
asymmetric information on the different degrees of investment via the use of simulations.  
 The simulation is conducted using Maple software. To do this simulation, we first 
initiate the parameters in our model using Macro data (for the mean of the gross return of 
risky asset and risk-free asset) or calibrated parameters from other literature (the 
variances of the return, observation error and asset supply are referred from Coval).20 
Second, we generate 1000 observations for the random supply of new IT investment and 
the return of this IT investment according to its normal distribution using the given mean 
and variance. Third, for a fixed cost, we calculate the cutoff initial capital and thus the 
proportion of informed investors. We further calculate the price and the demand of new 
 IT investment for each observation.  We also calculate the gain of information acquisition 
for each investor. Finally, we take an average of the new IT investment over 1000 
observations for each investor. In order to show how information costs affect the level of 
new IT investment, we repeat the third step by increasing the information cost, and then 
collect the new demand of IT investment. We illustrate these results in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2.  
 Table 1 lists the simulation parameters for the model. The average gross return for 
risky asset is set to 1.12 referring to the annualized monthly return for equity asset, 
including IT assets.  The return of risk-free asset is set to 1%. The variances of the return, 
observation error and asset supply are referred from Coval.20 The mean of the asset 
supply is set to be 1 unit.  The initial capital is assumed to be uniform distribution in the 
model across the investors; however we choose an array of the number between 0 and 1 
so that we can describe the individual decisions. 
 
Table 1.  The parameter values 
Parameters Values 
The return for risk-free asset r = 1.01 
The average return for risky assets E (θ) = 1.12 
The variance for the return φ = 0.5 
Τhe variance of the observation error of the return σ = 0.4531 
The average supply of risky assets  
The variance of the asset supply χ  = 0.5735 
The distribution of the initial investment [0,.1,.2,.3,.4,.5,.6,.7,.8,.9,1] 
The coefficient of risk aversion a = a(K0) = 1/K0 
The information cost c1 = ct-1 + 0.04 
 
 For calculating information cost, we use a recurrence function 1 0.03t tc c −= +  to 
generate a series of cost for the purpose of repeated simulations, where t  is used to 
represent different simulations.  The initial cost 0c  is chosen to be close to 0 so that we 
try to see the situation with the low information cost.  The choice of this function follows 
the criteria: (1) for each information cost, there exists an equilibrium K  with the range 
of [0,1] , where K  is the cutoff initial capital for the marginal investor, who is 
indifferent between being informed and being uninformed; and (2) the different 
information costs chosen can properly reflect the effect of asymmetric information on the 
different degrees of  investment. 
 The simulations describe the information acquisition process and investment 
decision.  We first generate 1000 observations of the asset returns and the total asset 
supplies, which are normally distributed with means and variances given in Table 1.  To 
identify the information acquisition process, we first calculate the cutoff initial capital for 
the marginal investor in equilibrium according to Eq. (2.8).  Then each investor with 
different initial capital decides to be informed or not informed based on the sign of the 
gain function at Appendix E. If the gain is positive, then he becomes informed. Otherwise 
he stays uninformed.  Both types of investors make their investment decision based on 
the demand function in Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4) where prices are calculated from Eq. (2.7).  
For the same draw of asset returns and supplies, we repeat the information acquisition 
and investment decisions at different information costs. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the proportion of informed investors 
and the information costs. When cost is as low as 0.004, the cutoff capital is 
approximately 0.67.  In an economy with the uniform distribution of the investors, this 
implies approximately 33 percent of investors become informed.  A check indicates that 
the gain to information acquisition is negative for the investors with initial capital less 
than 0.67, and positive for the investors with initial capital higher than 0.67. When the 
information cost increases from 0.004 to 0.274, the cutoff initial capital for the marginal 
investors increases from 0.67 to 0.99.  That is, an increase in the information cost 
increases the percentage of uninformed investors. 
 
Fig. 1. Information cost and information acquisition decision 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the cumulated IT investment for the mangers that are uniform 
distributed between 0 and 1. We took four representative cases with the equilibrium 
cutoff initial capital at 0.67, 0.73, 0.82 and 0.93 (corresponding to the information cost 
ratio 0.004, 0.064, 0.154 and 0.244 respectively; notice the rest of the cases will follow 
the same pattern as one of these four cases).  We report the cumulative level of the 
investment from the investors with initial capital 0.1 to 1. As we expected, the level of 
investment is low for the uninformed investor with the low initial capital, and the level of 
investment rises when the investors becomes informed. For example, when cost is equal 
0.064, the cutoff initial capital is 0.73. This implies that, in our sample, the investor with 
initial capital 0.8 will become informed. This appears in the figure that there is a jump in 
the level of investment at manager with initial capital 0.8. The jump points happen at 
initial capital at 0.9 and 1 for the case of cost = 0.154 and cost = 0.244 respectively.   
  Figure 2 also indicates the difference in new investment between informed 
managers and uninformed managers is more pronounced when information costs 
increase.  This can be seen from the curves before kink points and after. Before the kink 
points, the uninformed investors invest less when information cost increases. This is 
because high information costs lead to less proportion of informed investors, and thus 
decrease the “informativeness” of the price system.  After the kink points, we see the new 
IT investment jumped to a higher level for the higher information cost cases, which is 
caused by the informed managers.  Therefore, we can see that the difference in the level 
of new IT investments between informed managers and uninformed managers becomes 
bigger. 
 In summary, the simulations detailed above illustrate the effect of asymmetric 
information on different levels of IT investment. Holding other things constant, fewer IT 
investors are informed when information cost increases, and in consequence the 
difference of investment level between the informed and uninformed investors is more 
pronounced.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper explores the role of asymmetric information in explaining the different levels 
of IT investment made by IT managers at the firm level. Our model considers the 
information acquisition process with heterogeneous investors as the context in which 
such investment decisions are made. Using a simulation, we demonstrate a direct link 
between initial capital available, the cost of acquiring information and the different levels 
of new IT investments made by IT managers.   
 Recent empirical research at the firm level suggests that the marginal returns on 
investments in IT far exceed the marginal cost.21,13 Anderson et al. provide further 
evidence that firm value is positively associated with relatively large IT investment.6 All 
 of this evidence reiterates the importance of IT investment and its impact on firm value or 
productivity.  However, in contrast, our study of the different levels of IT investment in 
firms indicates that not all firms have taken advantage of IT investments. The reason, as 
our model and simulation shows, is related to the lack of awareness and understanding by 
managers of the true nature of returns on IT investment due to the cost of acquiring 
information. Specifically, we found that firms with larger initial capital outlay have a 
competitive advantage in their ability to acquire information about the context of their IT 
investment portfolio because the information cost per unit of investment is relatively low. 
 Our research has important implications for IT managers who make critical 
investment decisions in their firms, particularly relating to new IT initiatives.  The results 
also provide some indication as to how IT projects should be evaluated and the 
managerial ability needed to effectively invest and optimize an organization's IT 
portfolio. For example, IT managers who can obtain more information about the IT 
industry and different IT applications and understand costs and risks associated with 
emerging IT, are perhaps, likely to have more profitable IT investments. 
 Indeed, the theoretical model puts some limitations on real application. For instance, 
we assume an exponential utility and negative relationship between risk aversion and 
initial investment capitals to simplify the calculation. Therefore it leaves many issues 
open for further empirical study to justify the information role relating to IT investments. 
For example, an issue for further research is the need to evaluate the correlation between 
the size of IT investments (or a proxy such as the number of IT projects) and the 
measurement of asymmetric information. Our theoretical model posits that if managers 
have more initial capital outlay on related IT investment choices, we should find an 
increase in the investment devoted to new IT investment. This follows from the fact that 
the managers with a larger initial capital find it advantageous to acquire information on 
the new IT investment, and thus eliminate the asymmetric information rationale for the IT 
investment. The larger initial capital can be a result of previous investment or previous 
projects. One possible way to empirically analyze the role of asymmetric information on 
the size of IT investment is to check the correlations between the current investment and 
previous investment.  
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Appendix A.  Derivation of Price Functions 
 
We prove that the price of the asset is a solution to Eq. (2.5). We start with: 
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 Because θ ,ε and s  are mutually independent, with Eq. (2.6) we have the following  
equations:
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 With above equations, we can see that  P  is a linear function of the price 
function w , thus we have: 
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Note that the risk aversion coefficient is: 
0
0
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Substituting the price function into the right side of the equilibrium condition (first 
equation of Eq. (2.5)), we have  
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 Thus we have shown that demand for the asset at the specified equilibrium price 
does equal the supply of that asset.  
  
Appendix B.  Calculation of the Expected Utility for the Informed and Uninformed 
 
We calculate below an explicit form for the expected utility of an informed investor. To 
begin, we have expected utility: 
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Using demand functions and the fact that the price is the function of ( )sθ, , we have  
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Substituting these equations, we obtain,  
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Recall that the price is a linear function of wλ  which is also determined by a 
particular ( )sθ, . Applying this to above equation yields:  
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Thus, combining the above expressions, we have that,  
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Similarly, the expected utility for the uninformed investors is given by: 
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Appendix C.  Calculation of the Gain to Information Acquisition  
 
The expected gain of information acquisition is obtained by comparing the utility of 
becoming informed to that of remaining uninformed.   Based on Appendix B, the gain is 
given by: 
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It follows that 
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2  
 
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from the equilibrium conditions.  According to the 
equilibrium Eq. (2.8), we have 
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Taking square and then logarithms of both sides of the above equation and differentiating 
with respect to K  and c , we obtain after rearranging: 
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where 
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(AD.1).  Thus we have shown that the equilibrium cutoff K  is monotonically increasing 
in the information cost c .  
 
Appendix E.  Comparison of Expected Asset Demand 
 
From Eq. (2.3), we have:  
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From Appendix C, we already have:  
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Thus, comparing ( )IE I  with ( )UE I  leads to: 
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The last inequality is a natural result from equilibrium Eq (2.9): 
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The last equality implies: 
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where the strict inequality holds due to costly information ( 0c > ).  Therefore, we have 
shown that  
4
4 2
2
2
2 2 2
4
(1 )
1 1                                           
( )
K
φ
σ χ
φ
σ σ φ
+
−
≥
+ −
 
Thus we prove that ( ) ( )U IE I E I≤ , where strict inequality holds due to costly 
information ( 0c > ).  
